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From Cause and Effect to Effectual Causes: Can we talk of a 
philosophical background to psycho-social studies? 
 
JULIAN MANLEY 
 
Introduction 
The contemporary dawning of a realization of another, more complex truth to the 
understanding of human cognition did not emerge ‘out of the blue’, so to speak, but had 
its roots in an alternative line of philosophical thought which had, until recently, been 
situated on the fringes of debate and discussion. This article aims to trace the 
development of this philosophical alternative from its roots in the seventeenth century 
Dutch philosopher, Baruch Spinoza, to the contemporary emergence of what I call the 
‘psycho-social attitude’, the adoption of which, in my opinion, is necessary to the 
successful practice of psycho-social research.  
 
I begin, therefore, by discussing Spinoza and the explicit links between his philosophy 
and that of post-modernist philosopher Gilles Deleuze, and the ‘deep ecologist’ 
philosopher, Arne Naess. I make a clear distinction between these philosophers and the 
Cartesian line of thought that has been so deeply influential for the last three hundred 
years or so. In particular, the article sets out to demonstrate that Descartes’ linearity and 
its consequent cause-and-effect duality, have been increasingly questioned in the course 
of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In discussing this challenge to Cartesian 
thought I show how various different thinkers all question Cartesian linearity in their 
own ways, thinkers as diverse as Bergson at the turn of the nineteenth century, Freud, 
the ‘father’ of psychology, Merleau-Ponty and his work on phenomenology, Foucault 
and his ‘histories’, and Lacan and his analysis of language. I make a special case of 
Deleuze’s work on the concept of ‘affect’ (defined below) as a holistic form of emotion 
because this seems to me to be the crux of the psycho-social attitude. Finally, I link this 
to Naess’s holistic ecology.  
 
By finishing with ecology, the article touches upon one of the vital issues of our modern 
world. This is deliberate. I wish to suggest that an understanding of affect, of a world of 
‘effectual causes’, might help us to improve our research into the organic relationships 
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that we intersubjectively share between ourselves and our environment. Psycho-social 
research thus framed can help us move forward in this respect with greater hope and 
creativity for the future.   
 
Spinoza and Process 
Spinoza was persecuted and ignored in the seventeenth century and for years afterwards 
and it is only recently that his philosophy has been reassessed, largely thanks to the 
appreciation and acknowledgement of Gilles Deleuze and, in a way that is not obviously 
connected at first sight, of the Norwegian philosopher, Arne Naess. I believe that by 
understanding in what way these two areas of philosophy – that of Deleuze’s post-
modernist France and  Naess’s Norwegian ‘Deep Ecology’ – are linked we will be able 
to open up some interesting and heretofore unperceived insights into a philosophy that 
has the potential to provide us with an encompassing framework of thinking for the 
psycho-social outside what are generally understood to be the parameters of psychology 
and sociology.  
 
To begin with, however, it needs to be said that an understanding of what I see as the 
philosophical demands of the psycho-social attitude relies not only on adopting, 
(whether one is aware of it or not), a Spinozian approach to thought, but also a certain 
rejection of Cartesian postulates. By ‘psycho-social attitude’ I mean the acceptance, on 
the part of the researcher, of that non-judgmental, listening role implied in Wilfred 
Bion’s advice to the psychoanalyst to approach all emerging thought without memory 
or desire (Bion 1998, pp. 15-19) making it possible to allow the flow of emotional 
undercurrents of holistic ‘affect’ as ‘effectual causes’ that move ‘as links in a circular 
series’ (Bion 2000, p.101). This complex and vital notion is further explored in the 
course of this article. By ‘Cartesian postulates’ I mean the general idea that thought and 
understanding is necessarily understood in terms of cause and effect. It is both 
impossible in this brief article and unnecessary to delve into a much more detailed 
account of what I understand by ‘Cartesian’. In sum, I mean the following:  
1. A conception of the world as governed by a logic of dualities and a linear sense 
of causes and effects; 
2. An understanding of nature and man as being intelligible as mechanical 
constructs; and 
3. The consideration given to the existence of God as a separate entity to Man. 
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For Descartes, then, the very thinking process and the definition of life was reduced to 
the action of the brain. That is to say, that for Cartesian logic the being thinks and 
therefore exists. The thought of the brain is, as it were, the cause of our awareness of 
existence. Existence is the ‘effect’ caused by the thinking process. Consequentially, 
existence without thinking would not be possible. This led to the sweeping aside of the 
importance and value of a wider, more embracing attitude to existence, which might 
have included, for example, emotion and feeling as part of an ‘embodied mind’ and as 
legitimate ways of ‘thinking’, learning and understanding. The alternative idea, that we 
might learn and therefore understand through processes which were not founded in the 
thinking brain, has not been generally acceptable as science and only admitted in the 
expression of the creative arts, that is to say in the ‘unscientific’ world. Cartesian 
concepts of duality and processes of linearity became accepted as necessary truths in 
our understanding of the world, for development, evolution and progress. In this way 
we made the machines of the industrial revolution as logical constructs that depended 
on each part being causally connected to the next, its ‘effect’. Machinery as a concept 
was applied equally to science and people. In science, ‘the world as a perfect machine 
governed by exact mathematical laws’, was epitomised by Newtonian mechanics (Capra 
1997 p. 20), and in human organisation, ‘Taylorism’ converted people management into 
a ‘science’ and human collectives into ‘systems’ (Taylor 1911). The mechanical 
flowering of human life in all its aspects gave people hope of being able to control the 
human environment, and created the appearance of understanding. We were given the 
opportunity of creating causes for all observable effects in never ending linearity. 
 
It is this concept of linearity that has been questioned in post-modern philosophy and 
other contemporary philosophy, such as in the work of Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, Lacan 
and Naess, all of whom are discussed below. Linear ways of seeing the world are also 
singularly unhelpful for the theory and practice related to the psycho-social attitude that 
is predominantly subjective and emotional in nature. 
 
Foucault and the Move Away From Descartes 
Foucault’s work in general is instructive in this respect. We can see, for example, in 
Foucault’s Madness and Civilization an indication of how Cartesian thought 
unconsciously rejected a Spinozian approach.   
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To begin with, the very basis of Foucault’s work – the facts of history – is in itself a 
questioning of Cartesian ‘truths’. Does Foucault really present us with the history of 
society’s approach to the problem of madness?  On the face of it, yes he does. The book 
appears to be researched as a history and is full of data of the kind you would expect to 
find in a history text. However, the ‘history’ soon becomes unsatisfactory as a ‘history’. 
The reader soon becomes aware of a kind of sub text, an ulterior purpose, as this history 
becomes more and more open to interpretation, as Foucault opens out the facts and, 
almost indirectly, as if we were thinking a history but feeling something else, we 
become aware of a profound understanding of the nature of ‘civilization’ and ‘madness’ 
and its relationship with the error of Cartesian thought. What Foucault demonstrates is 
how Cartesian thought could not bear the presence of folly, and called it ‘madness’. In 
doing so the ‘madness’ became dangerous so that mad people were treated firstly as a 
diseased kind that had to be expelled from society, secondly as criminals that had to be 
locked away and finally as an illness that needed treatment, but this last solution was a 
kind of self delusion imposed by the thinking brain as a kind of excuse to rid our 
thinking society of such anomalies which were unacceptable to rational thought, 
threatening, even. It is difficult not to see some parallel here between ‘civilization’s’ 
rejection of ‘madness’ and society’s rejection of Spinoza, both Spinoza the man and 
Spinoza the philosophical thinker. Foucault suggests that actually ‘civilization’ was 
attracted to the fantasy and imagination of the ‘mad’, and hence the morbid interest in 
Sade, to take Foucault’s example, and it does not seem too far fetched to imagine that 
the Dutch Jews and society found Spinoza simply too attractive, which would help to 
explain the extremity of their reactions and the absolute nature of Spinoza’s exile. But 
Foucault’s style, his use of history to create a semblance of ‘fact’ is brilliantly used to 
contrast that Cartesian ‘fact’ with how we feel about the ‘mad’ victims of that ‘fact’. 
And as we read the ‘facts’ they are presented to the reader in such a way that we 
suddenly realise that we are participating in the voyeurism that intellectually we would 
reject. In this way we get to feel what we could not have thought. This is why 
Foucault’s ‘history’ is full of dates and names on the one hand (the ‘facts’) and on the 
other hand quotation after quotation that describe the spectacle of madness. We 
ourselves, representatives of the Cartesian society as we read Foucault, are drawn into 
that mode of thought that is being criticised because, as Foucault says, ‘madness is not 
linked to the world and its subterranean forms, but rather to man, to his weaknesses, 
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dreams, and illusions…it insinuates itself within man, or rather it is a subtle rapport that 
man maintains with himself.’ (Foucault 2005, p.23) Consider, for example, the horrid 
attraction of being able to see something prohibited, a thing securely confined, away 
from the safety of reason, in fact with ‘reason’ giving the spectator a good excuse for 
surreptitious enjoyment, in the following example from Foucault:  
…in 1789, the dream of the Abbé Desmonceaux, in a little work dedicated to 
National Benevolence; he planned to create a pedagogical instrument – a 
spectacle conclusively proving the drawbacks of immorality: “these guarded 
asylums…are retreats as useful as they are necessary…The sight of these 
shadowy places and the guilty creatures they contain is well calculated to 
preserve from the same acts of just reprobation the deviations of a too licentious 
youth; it is thus prudent of mothers and fathers to familiarize their children at an 
early age with these horrible and detestable places, where shame and turpitude 
fetter crime, where man, corrupted in his essence, often loses forever the rights 
he had acquired in society.” (Foucault 2005, p. 197)  
 
What could be more inviting? Elsewhere, Foucault makes it clear to the reader what it is 
we are experiencing. By being ‘rational’ the sane close themselves into their minds to 
think their thoughts and to stave off the insane imagination. The quoted ‘historical’ 
example given above is a metaphor of a similar process: the reasoning of rational 
thought turns the viewing of the irrational into a learning process: the vision of the 
madmen is kept in a separate compartment from the inner vision, a splitting, as it were, 
of the individual mind: the sane, rational Cartesian mind is able to view the danger of 
the insane mind and its passionate imagination at a safe distance: ‘The savage danger of 
madness is related to the danger of the passions and to their fatal concatenation’ 
(Foucault 2005, p. 80). The Cartesian link in relation to this idea is also made clear by 
Foucault:  
Descartes closes his eyes and plugs up his ears the better to see the true 
brightness of essential daylight; thus he is secured against the dazzlement of the 
madman…In the uniform lucidity of his closed senses, Descartes has broken 
with all possible fascination, and if he sees, he is certain of seeing that which he 
sees. (Foucault 2005, p.102)  
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In order to understand Foucault’s message we have to become voyeurs ourselves, as 
readers, we have to feel the sensations that are being denounced. We find ourselves 
moving away from the idea of a ‘pure thought’ in a Cartesian sense and towards a more 
embracing and holistic way of thinking, a feeling thought, so to speak. It is not simply a 
question of the objectified ‘content’ that is presented in these texts, but the process of 
expression too. 
 
Affect: the ‘Feeling Thought’ 
The idea of the ‘feeling thought’ is another way of defining the key word ‘affect’ in the 
writing of Gilles Deleuze. It is a term that has acquired a sense of complexity largely 
due to a conceptual difficulty in translation. Deleuze uses the term ‘affect’ from the 
Spinozian use of the Latin word ‘affectus’. Spinoza, who wrote The Ethics in Latin, 
uses a word that has no direct translation into English, although it is usually translated 
as ‘emotion’. In the words of Samuel Shirley, the translator of one of the more recent 
editions of The Ethics, emotion‘is the usual translation of ‘affectus’, and the translator 
had best retain it in default of a more accurate term. It certainly seems odd to speak of 
‘the emotion of desire’, and this is sufficient indication that ‘affectus’ is not quite the 
equivalent of our ‘emotion’.’ (Spinoza 1992, p. 28). The best definition of ‘affectus’ is, 
naturally, Spinoza’s own: 
By emotion (affectus) I understand the affections of the body by which the 
body’s power of activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, 
together with the ideas of these affections. Thus, if we can be the adequate cause 
of one of these affections, then by emotion I understand activity, otherwise 
passivity. (III, def. 3) (Spinoza 1992, p. 103) 
 
The essential nature of ‘affectus’ then is that it combines body and mind, and it is 
always in activity. This is the way Deleuze understands Spinoza and therefore adopts 
the term ‘affect’. In Deleuze, the idea of ‘affect’ always being active, never passive, is 
connected to the concept of ‘becoming’. Affect is always in a state of becoming, always 
in transition between other states that may be passive. Similarly, for Spinoza, the 
principal emotions (‘affects’) are pleasure, pain and desire, and are only existing in 
activity. In this way, they too are ‘becoming’, although Spinoza never used this term. 
So, pleasure is the movement away from less pleasure, pain, a movement away from 
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less pain, and desire only existing in a hunger for what the subject has not. These, 
Spinoza calls ‘primary’ affects and all other secondary ‘affects’ arise from them.
1
  
 
The holistic understanding of ‘affect’ as a Deleuzian process that is heavily influenced 
by Spinoza, means that an ‘affect’ is ‘true’, in the sense that mind and body have 
combined in a single activity which is, as a result of this wholeness, under natural 
though autonomous control of the subject and his or her relationship with the exterior 
world. That is to say, any image of the mind of an emotion is equivalent to the reality of 
the body. There is no difference between the image of the mind and the reality. This is 
different, for example, to the hold of a passion, where the image of the mind is not in 
tune with the reality of the body. Unrequited love, for example, means that the body is 
not in action with the image of the mind and passivity ensues. Affect implies a harmony 
of action based on a union of the actions of the body and images in the mind that are in 
active communion with the exterior world. In this state, affect does not ‘belong’ to 
either the subject or the exterior world, it is a thing in itself. In Deleuze’s words: 
‘Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who 
undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in 
themselves and exceeds any lived.’ (Deleuze 2003, p. 164, D.’s italics). Later, Deleuze 
defines affects as ‘nonhuman becomings of man’ (Deleuze, 2003, p. 169, D.’s italics) 
and gives an example from Moby Dick: ‘Ahab really does have perceptions of the sea, 
but only because he has entered into a relationship with Moby Dick that makes him a 
becoming-whale and forms a compound of sensations that no longer needs anyone: 
ocean.’ (Deleuze 2003, p. 169) Affect, then, has a space and a duration: ‘It is a zone of 
indetermination, of indiscernability, as if things, beasts, and persons (Ahab and Moby 
Dick…) endlessly reach that point that immediately precedes their natural 
differentiation. This is what is called an affect.’ (Deleuze 2003, p. 173, D.’s italics) The 
reason this is so essential to contemporary thought is that the idea of affect requires an 
understanding of a holistic space that indissolubly connects what otherwise would be 
dualities. This connection is a process, thus the emphasis on activity, action and 
transition, rather than content, with its corresponding inactivity, passivity and stasis. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 See (III, Definition of the Emotions, 1, 2 and 3) (Spinoza 1992, p. 141)   
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Holistic Thinking  
The idea of process over content is, therefore, an essential feature of contemporary 
holistic thinking, with its roots in Spinoza, its development in Deleuze and its antithesis 
in Descartes. This is what Deleuze means when he says that ‘the unit of understanding 
is not the form or function or organism but the composition of affective relations 
between individuals, together with the  “plane of consistency” on which they interact, 
that is, their “environment”’ where ‘environment’ is ‘a field of forces whose actions 
await experiencing. In a human sense it can be called the unconscious, or at least the 
ground on which the unconscious is constructed.’ (Deleuze, 1988, p.ii) This 
‘composition of affective relations’ can be seen in the example above from Foucault’s 
Madness and Civilization where it is composed of: the reader, the Abbé Desmonceaux, 
Foucault himself, and the split between the thinking mind and the passionate mind 
personified through metaphor. It is the metaphorical personification of the mind which 
enables the affective relations to come into play and releases the reader from, in 
Deleuze’s terms, his or her role as a ‘functioning organism’, that is to say, an objectified 
thinking brain which in turn analyses thought as its object as we would understand it in 
Cartesian terms. The Spinozian term used to express this process is the ‘common 
notion’, which Deleuze links to his preferred use of the term ‘composition’: ‘In short, a 
common notion is the representation of a composition between two or more bodies, and 
a unity of this composition. Its meaning is more biological than mathematical…’ 
(Deleuze, 1988, p. 54). And the importance of the ‘common notions’, of this 
‘composition’ as a combination of relationships of thoughts, understandings and affects, 
is in the truth of its complete existence in and around itself as opposed to any existence 
possibly engendered through any particular cause leading to an identifiable and separate 
effect, what Spinoza had defined as ‘self-cause’: ‘By that which is self-caused I mean 
that whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature can be conceived only as 
existing.’ (Spinoza, 1992, I, Def. 1, p. 31) It follows that that the importance of any 
‘cause’ is not in its ‘effect’ but in the relationship between the two: ‘The knowledge of 
an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of the cause.’ (Spinoza, 1992, I Ax.4, 
p. 32) What this eventually suggests is that life itself is defined by a cyclical and web-
like process of relationships rather than by any lineally arranged individual features of 
any particular thing or object. In this way, Spinoza links all things into a process called 
‘life’, and this is what Deleuze later calls a ‘common plane of immanence’ in his 
discussion of Spinoza:  
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…the plane of immanence, the plane of Nature that distributes affects, does not 
make any distinction at all between things that might be called natural and things 
that might be called artificial. Artifice is fully part of Nature, since each thing, 
on the immanent plane of Nature, is defined by the arrangements of motions and 
affects into which it enters, whether these arrangements are artificial or natural. 
(Deleuze, 1988, p. 124)  
 
Thus, in Deleuze’s own work on philosophy and the brain, he can define life as 
encapsulating the inorganic and the organic as a whole life process: ‘Not every 
organism has a brain, and not all life is organic, but everywhere there are forces that 
constitute microbrains, or an inorganic life of things.’ (Deleuze, 2003, p. 213) Similarly, 
instead of identifying brains as being the property and life-defining element of the 
higher species of individual organisms, that is by rejecting the Cartesian concept of 
thought as a definition of existence, Deleuze is able to talk of the life process as a whole 
as a ‘collective brain.’ (Deleuze, 2003, p. 212). The ‘collective brain’ is the constitution 
of all the ‘microbrains’ of everything. A ‘microbrain’ is anything which lends itself to 
‘contemplation’ and ‘contraction’, so that a plant could have a ‘microbrain’:  
The plant contemplates by contracting the elements from which it originates – 
light, carbon, and the salts – and it fills itself with colors and odors that in each 
case qualify its variety, its composition: it is sensation in itself. It is as if flowers 
smell themselves by smelling what composes them… (Deleuze, 2003, p. 212)  
 
That is to say, the plant ‘contracts’ and synthesizes primary materials
2
 and produces a 
new reality. This reality becomes its ‘composition’ and in its ‘composition’ an ‘affective 
relation’ is established with another subject through the affect of pleasure experienced 
by the action of smell: The sensation of smell can only exist in each subject – human 
and plant – through the existence and collaboration of each other. The moment of affect 
is both the moment of the smelling action and the emission of the smelling sensation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
  For Deleuze, this would be much in the same way as Bergson’s memory ‘contracts’ 
different elements to produce a new reality, (see below). 
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Merleau-Ponty and intersubjectivity  
There is much here which is to be found in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. 
Deleuze makes a distinction between his philosophy and that of phenomenology, 
claiming that the latter, while moving away from Cartesian thought, still sees man as a 
subject and relationships between men as intersubjective, as opposed to Deleuzian 
thought which takes away subjectivity of individuals by turning the very brain into the 
subject, that is to say whatever sensations that come into the brain are subject and since 
all enters the brain, all is one subject, as it were. Thus sensations are ‘brain’, (‘Sensation 
is no less brain than the concept’ (Deleuze, 2003, p. 211)), and the subject is in the 
painting of an empty landscape as it is ‘peopled’ by this brain, (‘We will speak of the 
brain as Cézanne spoke of the landscape: man absent from, but completely within the 
brain’ (Deleuze, 2003, p. 210)). It is, however, debatable that Deleuze’s vision is so 
very different from Merleau-Ponty’s. Note how similar to Deleuzian thought, for 
example, is the following from Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception: 
…to look at an object is to inhabit it…Thus every object is the mirror of all 
others. When I look at the lamp on my table, I attribute to it not only the 
qualities visible from where I am, but also those which the chimney, the walls, 
the table can ‘see’…I can therefore see an object in so far as objects form a 
system or a world, and in so far as each one treats the others round it as 
spectators of hidden aspects… (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 79).  
 
Whatever the subtleties of difference that may or may not exist between Deleuze and 
Merleau-Ponty, certainly, phenomenology was already moving away from linearity and 
Cartesian influenced thought in general. Thus we find concepts such as the 
interconnectivity of the universe through what Husserl called ‘intersubjectivity’ 
(Husserl, 2006, p. 171) and a tendency to view inter-relatedness as patterning:  
The phenomenological world is not pure being, but the sense which is revealed 
where the paths of my various experiences intersect, and also where my own and 
other people’s intersect and engage each other like gears. It is thus inseparable 
from subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which find their unity when I either take 
up my past experiences in those of the present, or other people’s my own. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. xxii).  
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This intersubjectivity and patterning is also a means of bringing the organic nearer to 
the inorganic in a single relationship, (reminiscent of Deleuze’s ‘collective brain’ 
above), which is what Merleau-Ponty means when he talks about ‘the organic 
relationship between subject and world’. (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 176) It then follows 
that as a result of patterning and intersubjectivity, Merleau-Ponty denies objectivity 
because perception depends on context: ‘…the perceived, by its nature, admits of the 
ambiguous, the shifting, and is shaped by its context.’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 13) 
Ultimately, the very concepts of space and time, necessary for any idea of ‘cause’ and 
‘effect’ are brought into doubt as existing as separate entities, rather they are part of a 
whole which includes our perceptive beings:  
We must therefore avoid saying that our body is in space, or in time. It inhabits 
space and time…I am not in space and time, nor do I conceive space and time: I 
belong to them, my body combines with them and includes them…The synthesis 
of both time and space is a task that always has to be performed afresh. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2005, pp. 161-162) 
 
Perhaps it is in this question of time and space where the difference between Merleau-
Ponty and Deleuze becomes most apparent. As we have seen, for Merleau-Ponty, the 
essential element in any consideration of the universe is the self, so time, for example, is 
defined according to the ‘I’. For Deleuze, however, the idea of time is not necessarily or 
only linked to the ‘I’, but, taking his thought from that of Henri Bergson, time is a 
universal concept which can be considered as a something in itself, as true in linearity, 
or, in its relativity, as relative to all other relativity, not just the phenomenological 
subjective self.   
 
Henri Bergson and Time 
For Bergson, and this more often than not means for Deleuze as well, the self as a 
subject does include Merleau-Ponty’s subjectivity, and that is understood as 
‘affectivity’.
3
 However, in Bergson, the concept of time in the self is related to a sense 
of memory which is two-tiered: the memory inside the mind, ‘recollection-memory’, 
and the memory of perception, ‘contraction-memory’, which is also in the mind but fed 
inside from an external perception of matter which is then ‘contracted’ into ideas of 
                                                 
3
 Affectivity ‘assumes that the body is something other than a mathematical point and 
which gives it volume in space.’ (Deleuze, 2002, 25, D.’s italics) 
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what is perceived both ‘objectively’ and in association to the experiences of the self, so 
that perception is never ‘pure’ but a mixture of that original objectivity of what is really 
there and the associations attached to perception through the action of memory. The 
perceived elements are ‘contracted’ in the processing of the mind so that perception 
becomes a relationship, or patterning, of matter and memory. This pattern of perception 
is at the same time linked to the ‘historical’ duration of the memory in the mind. In both 
cases, which are in constant movement and fusion, there is always a sense of the 
present, so that it is possible for the past to exist in the memory but be forever brought 
up into the present in the instance of perception and the constant state of processes of 
the self. Furthermore, memory is what transmits sensations to present perception, and 
matter is what transmits a sense of movement within that space, and therefore the 
possibility of future by defining the space within which future action will take place. 
Both of these constitute a state of ‘becoming’ that we define as being the ‘present’, and 
this present can, therefore, only exist through my body in space, because it is my body 
that feels and moves. The self exists for Bergson not as a thinking brain but as a feeling 
body which moves in space, and the body does not exist in isolation but is ‘extended’ in 
its connections in time and space. The ‘non-extended’ can only be conceived of through 
the possibility of a ‘pure memory’ which exists in Bergson only as a concept that can 
demonstrate its practical non-existence. That is to say, ‘pure memory’ must be situated 
in the non-extended self, the being as a separate entity as opposed to the extended self. 
In this state, ‘pure memory’ has neither action nor utility because it cannot act or 
interact with space and time. Memory which is brought to bear upon the present must be 
created in a sensorial image:  
Memory actualised in an image differs, then, profoundly from pure memory. 
The image is a present state, and its sole share in the past is the memory from 
which it arose. Memory, on the contrary, powerless as long as it remains without 
utility, is pure from all admixture of sensation, is without attachment to the 
present, and is, consequently, unextended. (Bergson, 2005, p. 129)  
 
In Bergson, therefore, we have the possibility of a time, (and a space within that time), 
which is both linear and patterned and relative. What is important here in our discussion 
of post-Cartesian thinking is that linearity, if it exists in time, does not depend on cause 
and effect. Rather, an idea of the existence of the dynamics of cause and effect in 
certain circumstances is only one of many different ways we have of understanding the 
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universe and its multiple realities. What is linear is the totality of time as we perceive it 
in our bringing forth our past memory to our present perception, what Bergson called 
‘duration’ (Bergson 2005 p. 262), within which there are multiple layers of seamless, 
interconnecting time capsules.  
 
But to see linear movement as a feature of existence does not mean that we have to 
identify this with Cartesian ideas of cause and effect. Thus, for Bergson, the future is 
not the effect caused by the present, and it is both a continuum and a multiple 
combination of inter-relatedness at one and the same time:  
The future then appears as expanding the present: it was not, therefore, 
contained in the present in the form of a represented end. And yet, once realized, 
it will explain the present as much as the present explains it, and even more; it 
must be viewed as an end as much as, and more than, a result. (Bergson, 2005, p. 
192)  
 
The idea of ‘result’, which I am going to equate with ‘effect’, in Bergson is, therefore, 
only part of an intellectual contraction of an understanding of the present. The 
continuous passing of time ensures that the ‘result’ can only exist in the moment ‘once 
realized’. It is in that moment that the effect is intellectually contracted to include its 
cause, an illusion of cause and effect which is immediately vanquished by the passing of 
time. This illusory state is, however, at the same time, simultaneously instantaneous and 
ephemeral and continuous, as one state of the present is constantly replaced by another, 
in Bergson’s words, ‘a present ceaselessly reborn’. (Bergson, 2005, p. 205) The ‘result’ 
is consciousness and exists in a moment of duration that combines movement of time 
and ‘effectivity’ or action in space. (Bergson 2005, p. 129) The unconscious is, on the 
other hand, that which is ‘ineffective’ (Bergson 2005, p.129) in the sense that it does not 
‘preside over action’ or ‘enlighten choice’ (Bergson 2005, p.205).  
 
However, although for the purposes of illustration we can make these distinctions, there 
are, in fact, no real dividing lines between the parts and we can never answer the 
question what is ‘consciousness’ in relation to where does ‘unconsciousness’ begin: 
To tell the truth, it is impossible to distinguish between the duration, however 
short it may be, that separates two instants and a memory that connects them, 
because duration is essentially a continuation of what no longer exists into what 
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does exist. This is real time, perceived and lived. This is also any conceived 
time, because we cannot conceive a time without imagining it as perceived and 
lived. Duration therefore implies consciousness; and we place consciousness at 
the heart of things for the very reason that we credit them with a time that 
endures. (Bergson, 2005, p. 208)  
 
Bergson’s Time, Foucault’s History and Freud’s Symbolism 
Understanding the various possibilities of perception of time - which is crucial to 
Bergsonian thought - is fundamental in considering the nature of ‘cognition’. The 
meaning of ‘history’ for Foucault, for example, can only be grasped through an 
understanding of these different perceptual possibilities of the passing of time, its 
multiplicity of application and its naturally emergent form. If history has something to 
teach and, therefore, if we have something to learn from it, we cannot ignore the fact 
that any attempt at such an understanding can only be that which is filtered through the 
historian’s concept(s) of time. For Foucault, the study and understanding of history is 
very close to a Bergsonian concept of time. Thus, Foucault’s use of the word 
‘archaeology’, is an attempt to illustrate his understanding of time as the essential 
element of history in terms of linearity and layering or patterning. The word 
‘archaeology’ exemplifies, for Foucault, the idea of history existing in strata, ready to 
be uncovered, as if the past existed in the ruins of the present waiting for a future to 
uncover it. ‘Linear successions’ are replaced by ‘a set of deeper uncouplings’ within 
‘various sedimentary strata’, each of which has its own potential time scale: ‘each 
contains a periodicity that belongs only to itself’. In this way, what used to be an 
historian’s struggle to seek for the continuous in the discontinuous, that is to say trying 
to impose a linear and causal feel to a series of events that may just as well be viewed as 
discontinuous and linearly unconnected, can now be viewed as a multiplicity of strata 
which are linked, (or not), in many different ways, including, maybe, linearly. And the 
over-simplicity of the historical search for links between a pre-established series of 
events, (the pre-establishment being already imposed by a simplified view of sequence 
in time), is now replaced by what Foucault describes as: 
…a series of difficult interrogations: which layers should be isolated from each 
other? What type and criteria of periodization need to be adopted for each of 
them? What system of relations, (hierarchy, dominance, inter-arrangement, 
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univocal determination, circular causality), can be established between them? 
(Foucault, 1998b, p. 298)
4
  
 
In other words, Foucault sees time and history as being a complex non-linear ‘system of 
relations’. And because history is, for Foucault, about an effort to understand mankind 
rather than being simply an endeavour to record events, that is to say, because history 
and time have to be understood from a psychological perspective of the unconscious 
rather than just from that of realism and consciousness, the study of history and time are 
studies of cognition in its deepest sense. Foucault demonstrates how Freud’s ‘discovery’ 
of the unconscious has had to change all our thinking:  
…one can say that, starting with Freud, all the human sciences became, in one 
way or another, sciences of the psyche. And the old realism à la Emile Durkheim 
– conceiving of society as a substance in opposition to the individual who is also 
a kind of substance incorporated into society – appears to me to be unthinkable 
now…all there is now, basically, is psychology. (Foucault, 1998a, p. 252)  
 
Psychology, in the discovery of the unconscious, made it possible to remove causal 
linearity from contemporary thought, and to replace it with layers of meaning. Once 
again, we can compare this to Bergson’s ‘psychological’ view of historical evolution in 
time that admits the linear and the layered:  
But evolution has actually taken place through millions of individuals, on 
divergent lines, each ending at a crossing from which new paths radiate, and so 
on indefinitely. If our hypothesis is justified, if the essential causes working 
along these diverse roads are of psychological nature, they must keep something 
in common in spite of the divergence of their effects… Something of the whole, 
therefore, must abide in the parts… (Bergson 2005, p. 193) 
 
                                                 
4
 Further on, Foucault makes his concept of history clearly part of the historian’s 
concept of time and overtly criticises the historian who imposes a concept of time on the 
facts of history: ‘For history in its classical form, discontinuity was both the given and 
the unthinkable: it was both what presented itself in the form of scattered events, 
institutions, ideas, or practices; and what had to be evaded, reduced, effaced by the 
historian’s discourse in order to reveal the continuity of the concatenations. 
Discontinuity was that stigma of temporal dispersion which it was the historian’s duty 
to suppress from history.’(Foucault, 1998b, p. 299) 
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It is, of course, with Freud that these concepts questioning the Cartesian approach 
finally take a significant hold of an expansion of what we understand to be ‘cognition’. 
For Foucault, history is psychology, because Freud’s ‘discovery’ of the unconscious 
turns all thought into something resembling psychology:  
…the simple discovery of the unconscious is not an addition of domains: it is not 
an extension of psychology, it is actually the appropriation, by psychology, of 
most of the domains that the human sciences covered – so that one can say that, 
starting with Freud, all the human sciences became, in one way or another, 
sciences of the psyche. (Foucault 1998a, p. 252)  
 
It was the birth of psychology that created the difference between the ‘line’ of thought, 
as expressed in writing or the verbal utterance and the symbolic layering action of the 
unconscious. It is this difference that is parallel to Foucault’s history of sequential time 
and facts as opposed to his ‘psychological history’, the former being akin to rational 
linearity and the latter to the workings of the mind in its all-embracing sense. The act of 
writing is itself an act of history and sequential thought: hence Foucault’s dual activity 
of conscious and unconscious expression in his ‘histories’.  
 
But for Freud, the conscious and rational mind could still be used to ‘interpret’ the 
unconscious symbols, so that conscious and unconscious were clearly delineated, and 
there was a linear mode of expressive language appropriate for the former and another 
mode for the latter.
5
 In doing so, Freud was using a rational linearity typical of 
Cartesian thought, despite his discoveries. The further development of Freud’s ideas by 
Lacan brought out the essential impossibility of this method by demonstrating that the 
‘signifier’, (that is to say, the word used in the context of a sentence to denote an 
objective ‘thing’), has a limited linear quality, a limitation which is to be found in the 
complexity of the unconscious mind as reflected in language itself. That is to say, the 
signifier is sequential in as much as it forms a sentence in time, but it is layered in the 
sense that it never has one ‘signified’ objective ‘thing’ only but many overlapping 
layers of meaning that can proliferate within the time created by and within the psyche. 
                                                 
5
 So Freud was interested in using the language of the rational conscious mind to 
‘decode’ or ‘decipher’ the symbols of the unconscious language of the mind as 
expressed in dreams and/or free association: ‘His problem, finally, is not a problem of 
linguistics, it is a problem of decipherment.’ (Foucault 1998a, p. 253) 
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In this way, Lacan was able to talk of a  ‘signifying chain’ which nevertheless was 
simultaneously a ‘polyphony’:  
There is in effect no signifying chain that does not have, as if attached to the 
punctuation of each of its units, a whole articulation of relevant contexts 
suspended ‘vertically’, as it were, from that point. (Lacan 2001, p. 170).
6
 
 
Lacan: Language and Communication 
This now brings us to the crux of the matter with regards the problem of 
communication, because it now seems that neither time, nor linearity, nor cause and 
effect, nor consciousness and rationality, all in a Cartesian sense, can be taken for 
granted. So what kind of communication are we talking about when we ‘communicate’ 
if we cannot necessarily understand it to harbour all or even any of these qualities? This 
question is crucial because the tools of psycho-social research depend so much on 
language and communication. This is why Lacan himself was so interested in language: 
‘Bringing the psychoanalytic experience back to the Word and to Language as its 
grounding is of direct concern to its technique.’ (Lacan 1981, p. 53)  
 
To begin with, we should note that for Lacan communication is not about the conveying 
of information, that is to say it does not correspond to the primary function of rational 
thought: ‘For the function of language is not to inform but to evoke’ (Lacan 2001, p. 
94). And clearly this evocation has to do with the unconscious, the fact that the 
‘signifier’ cannot mean any single concrete ‘thing’ for any length of time, before being 
converted and metamorphosed into another ‘thing’ and then another for as long as the 
unconscious mind continues to think and within a time scale which is recreated by that 
same mind, what Lacan calls ‘an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier’ 
(Lacan 2001, p. 170). As a matter of fact, Lacan goes on to say that language is 
precisely anti-information, (rather than simply non-information):  
                                                 
6
 It is interesting to note how both Lacan and Derrida use the same image of the musical 
stave to describe this effect which Saussure had failed to notice: ‘But one has only to 
listen to poetry, which Saussure was no doubt in the habit of doing, for polyphony to be 
heard, for it to become clear that all discourse is aligned along the several staves of a 
score’ (Lacan 2001, p. 170). ‘It is a point on which Jakobson disagrees with Saussure 
decisively by substituting for the homogeneity of the line the structure of the musical 
staff, “the chord in music”. What is here in question is not Saussure’s affirmation of the 
temporal essence of discourse but the concept of time that guides this affirmation and 
analysis: time conceived as linear succesivity, as “consecutivity”’ (Derrida 1991, p. 44). 
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What this structure of the signifying chain discloses is the possibility I have, 
precisely in so far as I have this language in common with other subjects, that is 
to say, in so far as it exists as a language, to use it in order to signify something 
quite other than what it says. (Lacan 2001, p. 172, L.’s italics).  
 
And the significant clue to how this can be so is in Lacan’s concept of language as 
existing not in itself or in relation to a ‘thing’ which is ‘signified’ but rather in relation 
to ‘other subjects’: ‘What I seek in speech is the response of the other. What constitutes 
me as subject is my question. In order to be recognized by the other, I utter what was 
only in view of what will be.’ (Lacan 2001, p. 94) In this process of identifying 
communication as only existing in a relational sense, Lacan also identifies a relationship 
of time between subject and object which is not that of sequential logic and is, rather, 
reminiscent of Bergsonian time: ‘What is realized in my history is not the past definite 
of what was, since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I 
am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of 
becoming.’ (Lacan 2001, p. 94) We should remember here that when talking of ‘time’ 
in a Bergsonian sense, we are really talking about memory and duration, as discussed 
above. In this sense, there are connections between Lacan’s ‘temporality’ and Bergson’s 
‘duration’. For Bergson, the significant moment of perception is the instant of present 
duration which is always a combination of perception of the exterior reality combined 
with interior memory. This instant is conceptually similar to Lacan’s capturing of the 
patient’s desire in a given moment that comes from another (interior) place that exists 
apart from the language of (exterior) information. Language, then, for Lacan, has an 
exterior communication similar in concept to Bergson’s exterior perception. At the 
same time there is a moment of fusion of languages, of interior desire and exterior 
information, similar to Bergson’s duration that fuses past memory and actual 
perception. This is how Lacan puts it:  
This Language…has the universal character of a language which could make 
itself understood in all other languages, but at the same time, since it is the 
Language which seizes desire at the very moment in which it becomes human 
desire by making itself recognized, it is absolutely particular to the subject. 
(Lacan 1981, p. 57)    
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So language and ‘communication’ is, in this sense, primarily a self discovery rather than 
a communication of information from one person to an Other. The Other exists not as a 
recipient of information but as a link in a relationship with the subject. That is to say, 
the language relationship is one of a creative web between people rather than the giving 
of something for a purpose. The latter effect, that of communication reduced to the 
simplicity of information for the purposes of action, might be the kind of use of speech 
we associate with an act of communication as direct as giving an order in a hierarchical 
structure which permits this form of communication, for example, a military 
organization. And here, of course, the only response can be acknowledgement of receipt 
of information: “Yes, Sir”. This form of communication, which permits only rational 
and conscious conveying of information is very much one of cause-and-effect: the order 
is the cause of the action/effect. It is unequivocally linear and definitively inhuman, and 
this accounts for the highly controlled and artificial structures that are an integral part of 
military design. For Lacan, language is not an artificial conscious thought structure, 
language is actually physical and felt by the body and as a body: ‘…language is not 
immaterial. It is a subtle body, but body it is. Words are trapped in all the corporeal 
images that captivate the subject.’ (Lacan 2001, p. 95). Language, therefore, is not 
simply an abstract thought that can be separated from the entities of our own beings: If 
we look at nature and consider humanity in all its aspects as part of nature, then a 
completely different design is revealed. 
 
Arne Naess, Spinoza and the Psycho-Social 
For Arne Naess, the understanding of ‘nature’ is not simply, as some may assume from 
an ecologist such as Naess, a question of respecting our natural surroundings, as Naess 
himself has pointed out:  
As long as one retains current concepts of nature instead of Spinoza’s Natura or 
other broad, profound concepts of nature, the placement of ecology within the 
framework of natural sciences favours the shallow ecological movement. (Naess 
2001, p. 39).   
 
Spinoza’s ‘nature’, then, is what defines Naess’s so called ‘Deep Ecology’. This is 
similar to Deleuze’s ‘process’ and ‘becoming’ in its understanding of ‘nature’ as a 
holistic inter-connection of parts that necessarily includes man within that nature rather 
than as an outside agent. In Deleuze’s work, Spinoza’s ‘nature’ is most closely alluded 
Julian Manley From Cause and Effect to Effectual Causes 
 
 84 
to in What is Philosophy? Nature is, for Deleuze, a way of thinking that is necessarily 
far removed from the Cartesian ‘I think therefore I am’ and close to Spinoza’s concept: 
‘Thinking consists in stretching out a plane of immanence that absorbs the earth (or 
rather, “adsorbs” it).’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2003, p.88) In this sense, both Deleuze and 
Naess’s acknowledged source, Spinoza, would agree with Naess in saying that an 
effective relationship with nature depends on the process of active participation in an 
inter-subjective fashion that cannot contemplate the subject-object paradigm: ‘To ‘only 
look’ at nature is extremely peculiar behaviour. Experiencing of an environment 
happens by doing something in it…’ (Naess 2001, p. 63) This idea of nature is an 
understanding of the indissoluble interconnections between everything that exists, 
including humanity in every respect. In terms of the psycho-social attitude, this is an 
acknowledgement that ‘objectivity’ can only exist as a concept of the mind, rather than 
as a ‘truth’. That is to say, all is necessarily (inter-)subjective in the sense that the 
holistic all embracing nature of existence does not allow for the duality implied in a 
subject-object relationship. This further implies an error in the conception of lines of 
cause –and-effects and a correlating limitation to Cartesian approaches to thinking. For 
Spinoza, the nature of thinking is necessarily simultaneously a body and mind 
phenomenon: ‘…mental decision on the one hand, and the appetite and physical state of 
the body on the other hand, are simultaneous in nature; or rather, they are one and the 
same thing…’ (Spinoza 1992, p. 106) This acknowledgement of the emotions, or 
‘affect’, as ‘thinking’ features of Spinoza’s ‘body/mind’ is a philosophical stance that 
sits well with the psycho-social attitude as defined in the psycho-social approach by 
Clarke and Hoggett: 
First…recognizing the role of the unconscious mind in the construction of social 
realities, with its suggestion that feelings and emotions shape our perception and 
motivation, constructing the way in which we perceive others. Second, the 
psychoanalytic method recognizes the role of the researcher in the interpretation 
of realities…Finally, there is an integration of social, cultural, and historical 
factors at a conscious level…(Clarke & Hoggett 2009, p. 6) 
 
The value given to the unconscious in the psycho-social attitude is also alluded to by 
Spinoza when he discusses how ‘subjective’ dream thoughts are from the ‘body’ (i.e. 
emotion/affect) rather than from the ‘mind’, as evidence that thinking does not emanate 
only from conscious, awakened ‘objective’ thought, (Spinoza’s ‘mind’): 
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So I would very much like to know whether in the mind there are two sorts of 
decisions, dreamland decisions and free decisions. If we don’t want to carry 
madness so far, we must necessarily grant that the mental decision that is 
believed to be free is not distinct from imagination and memory…and those who 
believe that they speak, or keep silent, or do anything from free mental decision 
are dreaming with their eyes open. (Spinoza 1992, p. 107)    
 
For the philosophy of Arne Naess, then, ‘Deep Ecology’ is a perception of nature as an 
infinite web of interconnectivity. By understanding ourselves as human subjects in this 
inter-relationship with our environment, we come to understand our existence. Human 
beings are not, therefore, passive ‘effects’ resulting from ‘causes’, but kinetically active 
contributors to their mutual existences. As such, human beings are active participants in 
evolution, rather than mere survivors: ‘In view of the defensive passivity suggested by 
the term self-preservation, I prefer Self-realisation or Self-unfolding’ that implies 
Bergson’s ‘creative evolution’. (Naess 2001, p. 166) This ‘creative evolution’ depends, 
according to Naess, on ‘sharing joys and sorrows with others’, developing from ‘the 
narrow ego of the small child into the comprehensive structure of self that comprises all 
human beings’. (Naess 2001, p. 85) For the psycho-social attitude, this Naessian/ 
Spinozian philosophy can provide the backdrop for understanding how psycho-social 
practices work, by providing a collective opportunity for that ‘comprehensive structure 
of self’ to emerge. 
 
Final word: The broadening out of psycho-social studies 
At these final stages of this article, I would like to ask the question what possible 
benefits could a philosophical understanding bring to psycho-social studies and 
research? As I suggested above in discussing Arne Naess and the Deep Ecology 
movement, it seems to me that psycho-social approaches to the understanding of 
complex problems such as our relationship with the environment and serious global 
issues such as dealing with climate change can be enhanced in the knowledge that the 
psycho-social attitude can also be a way of developing solutions or ways forward in 
areas of human endeavour that are not confined to (group) psychology and/or sociology. 
These other areas may be, for example, ‘philosophy’, ‘politics’ or ‘ecology’. But all of 
these may also be grouped together by the embracing nature of a ‘holistic’ philosophy 
such as has been discussed in this article. In other words, I would suggest that the 
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philosophical background to the psycho-social proposed here encourages a greater 
potential extension and reach of the psycho-social than might otherwise be considered 
appropriate. This implies that when we talk of applying certain concepts derived from 
psychoanalysis and applied to sociology we should not limit our references to those 
areas of relevance alone, as defined by Clarke and Hoggett (2009, pp. 1-22). By not 
doing so and by placing the psycho-social within another flow or some overall 
philosophical tendency, we are open to new creative thoughts for and applications of an 
expanding discipline that is still in the throes of definition.   
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